Colombia: 35 Years and Still Struggling by JMU, CISR
Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction 
Volume 5 
Issue 2 The Journal of Mine Action Article 10 
August 2001 
Colombia: 35 Years and Still Struggling 
CISR JMU 
Center for International Stabilization and Recovery at JMU (CISR) 
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/cisr-journal 
 Part of the Defense and Security Studies Commons, Emergency and Disaster Management Commons, 
Other Public Affairs, Public Policy and Public Administration Commons, and the Peace and Conflict 
Studies Commons 
Recommended Citation 
JMU, CISR (2001) "Colombia: 35 Years and Still Struggling," Journal of Mine Action : Vol. 5 : Iss. 2 , Article 
10. 
Available at: https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/cisr-journal/vol5/iss2/10 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Center for International Stabilization and Recovery at 
JMU Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction by an 
authorized editor of JMU Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact dc_admin@jmu.edu. 
1
JMU: Colombia: 35 Years and Still Struggling
Published by JMU Scholarly Commons, 2001
• Members of an army 
demining team 
search for landmines 
planted by leftist 
rebels of the National 
Liberation Army in 
Colombia. c/o AP 
Conservative parries whose influence 
was felt throughout the whole coun-
try. Differences in ideology between 
the Liberal and Conservative elite ech-
oed throughout Colombian society, 
many times resulting in outbreaks of 
violence that placed the Liberal and 
Conservative factions against each 
other. 200,000 Colombians died dur-
ing the decade of fa violencia. 
In the late 1940's, Liberal Jorge 
Eliecer Gaitan, having surfaced from 
the Liberal and Communist led agrar-
ian and labor reform movements, was 
a leading presiden rial candidate. 
Gaitan was assassinated on April 9, 
1948, triggering a violent uprising by 
the Liberal lower classes that caused 
major looting and destruction in the 
capital. This uprising is known as the 
Bogotazo and was followed by many 
similar Liberal peasant uprisings 
throughout the country, pitting Lib-
erals and Conservatives against each 
other. 
Conservative candidate Laureano 
Gomez won the presidential election 
in 1950, after two high-ranking mem-
bers of the Liberal party were assassi-
nated in 1949. Gomez considered Lib-
era! peasants parallel to Communists 
and responded to the uprisings with 
violent repression. Liberals in the na-
tional police force were replaced with 
extremely brutal conservative peasants. 
In the early 1950's, the Gomez 
regime's repression became more in-
tense along with the violence between 
the rural Liberals and Conservatives. 
In 1953 Gomez was overthrown, 
and General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla rose 
to power. Pinilla attempted to recon-
cile citizens of the country, yet his 
plans backfired and the war between 
the Liberals and Conservatives grew. 
Pinilla responded by launching a rna-
• 30. 
jor military offense against the peas-
ant Liberals, known as the War of 
Villarica. It was during this offensive 
that the armed self-defense move-
ments formed, later to be known as 
the FARC. 
The FARC, Guerillas and Cocaine 
FARC is the most powerful gue-
rilla group in Latin America comprised 
of 17,000 members, which is more 
than the Colombian governmenr, and 
is accountable for numerous deaths. 
It is the only guerilla group with peas-
ant roots that pre-date both the Na-
tional Front and the Cuban Revolu-
tion. Other guerilla groups, such as rhe 
Popular Army ofLiberation (EPL) and 
the Army for National Liberation 
(ELN), were all movements led by 
urban intellectuals. Initially, rhe FARC 
was concerned with the socio-eco-
nomic issues of peasantry and poverty, 
but it is believed that rhe traditional 
insurgent group has grown into a tra-
ditional criminal or drug trafficking 
organization. 
Naturally, the FARC leadership 
denies all involvement in drug traffick-
ing. Yet relationships are known be-
tween the drug traffickers and FARC 
guerillas. The most prevalent relation-
ship is one in which the FARC units 
tax the drug trafficking business, pro-
viding protection in return for money 
or payment in cocaine. Yet, others ar-
gue that FARC is not only involved 
with protection of drug cultivation 
areas and laboratories, but includes the 
transportation of drugs and chemical 
precursors and in some cases, direct 
control of cocaine producing labora-
tories. Rand Beers, Assistant Secretary 
for International Narcotics and Law 
Enforcemenr, argues that the FARC 
and the ELN, the other major insur-
gent group, "are receiving pure cocaine 
in payment for services provided to the 
drug traffic, and reselling it" to Bra-
zilian criminal organizations in return 
for armaments. Evidence has shown 
that the FARC is attempting to widen 
its base of arms suppliers. Despite an 
estimated annual income of$500 mil-
lion (U.S.), FARC purchases signifi-
cant amounts of weapons with co-
caine. FARC leaders say they will con-
tinue to use money from illicit drugs, 
not only cocaine but heroin and mari-
juana, to finance their escalating war. 
Half of Colombia's territory is 
now controlled by the Marxist gueril-
las in league with cocaine growers and 
drug traffickers. This controlled terri-
tory is spilling over into neighboring 
countries with reports of guerilla in-
cursions into Venezuela, Panama and 
Ecuador, as well as sightings of coca 
and poppy plantations in Peru oper-
ated by Colombians. These guerilla 
groups are guilty of using landmines 
throughout the country. One reporter 
visiting Colombia and studying the 
social strife notes "Coca profits fuel 
Colombia's war just as surely as extor-
tion and kidnapping. And much of the 
fighting going on in Colombia is 
rooted in a struggle over who gets to 
control the money flow." 
The Threat of Landmines 
Nearly all major guerilla groups 
have publicly acknowledged that they 
not only use but also manufacture AP 
mines. The Colombian Armed Forces 
have identified and denounced the 
production of AP mines by Colom-
bian guerilla groups. Most of these 
mines are homemade, using cheap and 
easy to find materials. According to the 
Colombian Army's Press Agency, in 
the past few years there has been an 
increase in the use of homemade 
anrivehicle mines by guerilla groups. 
The antivehicle mines are manufac-
tured with gas, oxygen or refrigerat-
ing cylinders. 
AP mines are also manufactured 
and used by cocaine, poppy and mari-
juana growers to protect illegal drug 
crops, and to keep the Army and oth-
ers away from their laboratories and 
stockrooms. Information collected by 
the Colombian Campaign to Ban 
Landmines (CCBM) indicated that at 
least 135 ofColombia's 1,050 munici-
palities are mine-affected. The 135 
municipalities cover a total area of 
145,000 square kilometers or 13% of 
the national territory. 
Colombia's Armed Forces re-
ported that 52 mines placed in San 
Jose de Sumapaz department were dis-
covered on February 28, 2000. The 
mines were found along village paths, 
around the school and football field, 
and near the radio transmission sta-
tion on Granada Mountain. 
In November of 2000, two land 
mines were discovered outside a town 
hours before a U .S . senator and the 
U.S. ambassador were scheduled to 
visit. Though the U.S. officials were 
not the intended targets, they could 
have been victim to the mines. 
One author reported on rhe in-
nocence oflandmine victims: "In their 
attacks, guerillas employ methods that 
cause avoidable civilian casualties in 
violation of international humanitar-
ian law, including the use oflandmines 
and gas canister bombs packed with 
gunpowder and shrapnel." 
• 31 • 
Colombia signed the Mine Ban 
Treaty on December 3, 2000, but has 
not yet ratified it. Other attempts to 
legally control the production and use 
oflandmines have been implemenred. 
Colombia voted in favor of the De-
cember 1999 UN General Assembly 
resolution supporting the Mine Ban 
Treaty, and participated as an observer 
in the First Meeting of States Parries 
to the Mine Ban Treaty in Mapuro in 
May 1999. 
Conclusion 
Some fear that the likeliest out-
come in Colombia is "stalemate," 
complete with corrupt officials, black 
marketers, narco-traffickers and of 
course, the insurgents. The country's 
never-ending cycle is far from ending, 
and the population continues to live 
in fear. More has to be done for the 
country besides sropping the drug car-
rel. The problem's roots reach back to 
a long-lived civil war of peasantry and 
socio-economic issues. The social and 
political unrest is left in the hands of 
insurgent guerilla groups and drug 
traffickers. Where to begin in order to 
see the end is something Colombia has 
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